Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Difference and Repetition', 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness' and 'Critique of the Gotha Program'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

24 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
21901 'Difference' refers to that which eludes capture [Deleuze, by May]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
4901 Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
21908 Ontology can be continual creation, not to know being, but to probe the unknowable [Deleuze]
21902 'Being' is univocal, but its subject matter is actually 'difference' [Deleuze]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
21903 Ontology does not tell what there is; it is just a strange adventure [Deleuze, by May]
21904 Being is a problem to be engaged, not solved, and needs a new mode of thinking [Deleuze, by May]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
4885 Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
4899 Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
4898 Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
4887 We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
4884 Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
4888 It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
4891 If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
4900 Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
4892 If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
4889 Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
4896 The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
4897 A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
4890 A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
22971 In moving from capitalism to communism a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is needed [Marx]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
22969 People who only have their labour power are the slaves of those permitting them to work [Marx]
22970 Freedom is making the state subordinate to its society [Marx]
22000 From each according to his ability, to each according to his need [Marx]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
22972 Bourgeois 'freedom of conscience' just tolerates all sorts of religious intolerance [Marx]